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Most of the essays on Australian social organization which have been inspired by the books of
Howitt, Strehlow, and Spencer and Gillen have laid most stress on clan organization and the
marriage system. The present volume concerns itself chiefly with the religious aspects of
Australian sociology. M. Durkheim believes that the true explanation of totemism is the religious
one, and he has taken the Australians as the basis of his study of religious sociology because he is
convinced that they, being of the most primitive type, carry us nearest to the sources of religious
life. His initial position is that we shall be least likely to err if we assume that religious
phenomena are to be taken literally, for all primitive religions “hold to reality and express it,”[1]
and “there are no religions which are false.”[2] This is the basis of his objection to the animistic
and the nature-worship theories of the origin of religion. Moreover, primitive religious concepts
do not necessarily involve the supernatural, for miraculous interventions are, to primitive men, a
part of the natural order. The central fact about religion is that it is “something eminently social.
Religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities.”[3] In
all religions there are two comprehensive categories, beliefs and rites, and all involve a
classification of phenomena in two groups, the sacred and the profane.
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Now it is in connection with the totemic symbol that Durkheim finds the clearest separation of
the sacred from the profane. He differs [562] from the majority of recent scholars in making the
totem the religious center about which the clan is formed, for he insists that clan-relationship is
not based on blood-relationship. Totemism is really an elementary religion, holding latent those
ideas which later will develop into conceptions of divinities. Among most of the Australian tribes
the religious idea has as yet hardly developed beyond the conception of an impersonal religious
force, or a quasi-divine principle immanent in certain classes of men and things and thought of
under the forms of animals or plants. The totemic object is the symbol of the clan, much as the
flag is the symbol of the modern nation. While utterly rejecting Tylor’s theory that tribal or clan
totemism is a form of ancestor-worship, Durkheim holds that the individual totem, which is a
quite different thing, has the same characteristics as the ancestral spirit. To ancestors also is
ascribed credit for the tribal culture. These culture-heroes are an intermediate type between the
ancestral genius and the later tribal god, and they have had their share in developing a sense of
tribal unity.
It cannot be said that M. Durkheim has entirely escaped two pitfalls which have caught so many
recent students of social origins. He occasionally reads back into the savage mind something of
the abstruse mental processes of the critical scholar, and he attempts to find inclusive
generalizations which shall cover the most heterogeneous and often contradictory facts.
However useful may be the “sacred-profane” classification, it does not follow that “the religious
life and the profane life cannot coexist in the same unit of time” (p. 308)[4], for very many
religious rites, as much among the Australians themselves as elsewhere, have a distinctly
economic and utilitarian basis. It is no doubt true that the gradual separation of the two concepts
resulted in the setting aside of feast days and holy days, but these are clearly not primordial.
Less open to question is the theory that religious taboo (interdict, as M. Durkheim prefers to call
it) receives its chief sanction from the need of separating the sacred and profane. This “negative
rite” marks the beginning of asceticism, which is rightly held to be a primary and essential
element in religion, rather than a late and abnormal one. But it is in the “positive rites” of early
religion that the greater social institutions, as well as science itself, are found to have their
origin. These rites among primitive people are almost the only means of expression for the group
consciousness.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I treats of “Preliminary Questions,”[5] and particularly
of theories about the origin of religion. Part II discusses “Elementary Beliefs,”[6] by which is
meant totemism.
[563] One chapter contains a valuable critical analysis of the theories of Tylor, Wilken, Jevons,
Frazer, Lang, Hill-Tout, and Boas. Part III discusses “The Principal Ritual Activities.”[7]
M. Durkheim has certainly not made good all his objections to the views of Tylor and Lang, nor
has he here, any more than in his preliminary studies, published some years ago in L’Année
Sociologique, made out a wholly satisfactory case for his own theory of the origin of totemic
groupings. That three such scholars as Frazer, Lang, and Durkheim, using identical materials,
should arrive at entirely diverse results is a proof, not only of the intricacy of the subject, but
also of the imperfection of our present knowledge of it. For instance, how shall we explain those
cases where the totemic objects are natural phenomena or heavenly bodies, when all our theories
presuppose plants and animals? Or what shall we conclude about the “Arunta anomaly,”[8] even
with all that Lang and Durkheim have said in seeking to explain it? M. Durkheim’s views have at
least the merit of consistency. He is conscious that his theories do not cover all the facts of
totemism as found among the American Indians. He explains this by the claim that American
totemism, as we actually know it, represents an advanced type of the institution when its
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primitive elements had either begun to disintegrate or had perhaps become corrupted by contact
with European ideas.
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